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ABSTRACT 
In the run-up to 1997, British companies may gradually 
retreat from the territory (Jardine is the first British company 
to withdraw listing in HK) and China-related companies will 
become increasingly dominant. It is obvious, therefore, that 
companies with Chinese backing have significant advantages. 
In other words, companies controlled from the mainland are the 
best placed to capitalise on China's booming economy. 'Red 
Chips', simply put, refer to local-listed stocks which are either 
directly or indirectly controlled by mainland Chinese. The 
potential of the existing Red Chips are widely considered to be 
exceptional. This study is to compare the performance of，Red 
Chips' against the general trend of the overall market and to 
note whether，Red-Chips，have their own distinct pattern of 
performance. 
In our study, we found that 'Red-Chips' has a positive 
correlationship with the constituent stocks of the Hang Seng 
Index with a beta of less than the assumed value of the 
constituents stocks of Hang Seng Index, which shows that Red-
Chips have lower systematic risk. 
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1993 was a good year for the Hong Kong stock market. The 116% rise from 
Hang Seng Index (HSI) 5,431 points on 1st January 1993 to 11,888 points on 31st 
December 1993，it was arguably the best performance by a developed stock market 
in 1993. Much of the rise in 1993 occurred in the last quarter (55%), and 
particularly December (30%). 
'Blue-Chip' is a name associated with stocks which have a large market 
capitalization, and they are typically taken to be the majority or all of the constituent 
stocks of the Hang Seng Index in Hong Kong. The name，Blue Chip' is well known 
and accepted by investors as representing stocks that usually have a good record of 
consistency in profits, payment of dividends and good potential for further 
development, without being excessively affected by changes in the economy. The 
price of these stocks is usually higher than those of other stocks, although their 
relative dividend yields may be lower. 
The name，Red Chips' made its debut in Hong Kong recently. It refers to 
those companies that are controlled by mainland Chinese Corporations or are closely 
connected with Chinese concerns. In other words,，Red Chips' are controlled by 
PRC interests, which own at least 35% of the issued shares and have substantial 
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investments and earnings coming from China. The prevailing total market 
capitalization of these companies based on the closing prices of the Red Chip 
constituents on December 31，1993 is approximately HK$140 billion, accounting for 
5% of the overall market capitalization. 
'Chinese concept' stocks are regarded as those companies that have significant 
interests in the PRC but these companies are not controlled by PRC interests. 
However, those companies that have established manufacturing plants in the PRC and 
export their finished goods overseas, could not be classified as 'China concept stocks' 
as they only take the advantages of low labour cost but do not capture the China 
market. A selected list of China concept stocks is in Appendix One. 
It is anticipated that as 1997 is drawing closer and closer, the number of red 
chips in Hong Kong and their total market capitalization will significantly increase. 
Their impact and influence on the market will therefore become relatively more 
significant. 
1.1 Objectives of our study 
The majority of the stocks that constitute Hang Seng Index are regarded as 
Blue-Chips, which comprise 70.944% of total market capitalization in Hong Kong at 
November 29, 1991. Therefore, Hang Seng Index can be used to measure the 
performance of the Blue-chips as well as a market indicator. 
\ 
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The purpose of this study is to compare the performance of Red Chips against 
the constituent Blue Chip Stocks and to note whether 'Red-Chips' have their own 
distinct pattern of performance. 
1.2 Categories of Red Chips 
There are basically three types of Red Chip currently listed on the Hong Kong 
stock exchange. They are : 
(1) companies that are fundamentally strong with a solid business track record 
such as CITIC Pacific, Guangdong Investment, and China Overseas. There are 
altogether twelve companies falling into this group, (see Appendix Two). 
(2) ，H，shares listed in Hong Kong. Up to now, six state-owned enterprises have 
been listed. The remaining three (Dongfang Electric, Tianjin Bohai Chemical and 
Jiangsu Yizheng) of the initial batch of nine mainland enterprises to seek，H，share 
status are expected to be listed by the first half of 1994. (see Appendix Two). 
(3) ，back-door listings, shell companies taken over by China-backed firms; such 
shells include Shougang International, Shougang Grand and China Aerospace. The 
number of shell companies increased to twenty by the end of 1993. (see Appendix 
Two) 
Investors reckoned that companies controlled from the mainland were best 
placed to capitalise on China's booming economy. The Red chips frequently have the 
support of a strong and powerful PRC parent with access to good quality assets in 
China, which are often injected at considerable discount. 
\ 
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1.3 A. B and H shares compared 
In the PRC, equity securities did not come onto the business scene until 1984 
when the idea of a privately organised corporation was first mooted、The Chinese 
government turned to a market-oriented economy as a solution to the increasingly 
severe economic problems of poor efficiency and a low standard of living. Within 
this improved environment, the Chinese government started to issue a new type of 
stock (B shares) which were targeted at foreign investors and structured in accordance 
with the international standards. The first B share to be listed in Shanghai Securities 
Exchange was Shanghai Vacuum Electronic Device Co. on 21 December 1992. 
Some recent summarised developments in the market are included in Appendix Three. 
Shares in China are divided into state shares, enterprise shares, individual 
shares and B shares (foreign shares) according to the restriction on ownership. State 
shares, enterprise shares and individual shares are collectively referred as A shares. 
B shares are shares restricted to foreign investors, including investors from Hong 
Kong and Taiwan. B shares are denominated in renminbi and settled in foreign 
currencies (US$ for Shanghai Securities Exchange and HK$ for Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange). The subscription for B shares, and the subsequent trading, dividend and 
cash distribution are all paid in foreign currencies based upon prevailing exchange 
rates in the Foreign Exchange Transaction centres. With the exception of the 




restriction on the status of the shareholders, B shares have the same rights and 
obligation as ordinary shares. In fact, A and B shares are in two separate markets, 
the A share market is a closed market that is restricted to Chinese nationals in China. 
There is a high demand of shares, the stock markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen are 
the "seller" markets that the investors have no real choice of stock and caused highly 
speculative. As a result, the P/E ratio, company's earning capacity, asset/liability 
ratio do not impact on the price performance of the shares. 
On the other hand, B shares are structured in accordance with international 
standards and target for foreign investors. To invest in B shares, investors have to 
bear a number of risks which are summarised in Appendix Three. 
In view of the risks and problems detailed in Appendix Three, and the ease 
with which investors can now access 'China based' stocks, ie. 'Red-Chips, in the 
Hong Kong market, it is not surprising that interests in A and B shares has withered 
in recent months. 
To facilitate the listing of state-owned enterprises outside the country, China 
has created another class of shares - H shares. H shares are special renminbi -
denominated shares which may be subscribed for and traded in foreign currency 
exclusively by and between investors of Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan or any other 
country other than China. These stocks represent direct "China play" investment 
instruments. A total of 9 state-owned companies were approved by the state council 
for a listing via an issue of H shares on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK). 
\ 
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Of these, 6 were listed in 1993 and included Tsingtao Brewery, Shanghai 
Petrochemical, Guangzhou Shipyard, Beiren Printing Machinery, Maanshan Iron and 
Steel, and Kumming Machine Tool. These companies raised HK$5,977.23 Mn, 
representing 21.8% of total funds raised by new issues in 1993. Market responses 
to the initial public offers of these companies were mixed as indicated by their 
subscription rates. Kumming Machine Tool, for example, was 628 times 
oversubscribed while Shanghai Petrochemical had a subscription rate of only 1.73 
times (for further details see Table One), the average subscription rate of the 9 
redchips is 204.21 times. H shares, because they are traded in regulated markets, 




Capital raised and subscription rate of H shares listing 
H shares Amount raised Subscription rate 
(HK$Mn) 
1. Beiren Printing Machinery 208.00 25.00 
2. Denway Investment 402.60 658.00 
3. Guangzhou Shipyard 327.39 77.00 
4. Kumming Machine 128.70 628.00 
5. Maanshan Iron 994.26 68.70 
6. Shanghai Petrochem 2,654.40 1.73 
7. Stone Electronic 317.52 42.00 
8. Tsingtao Brewery 889.28 109.47 
9. Wing Shan 55.08 228.00 
Total HK$Mn 5,977.23 Average subscription rate: 204.21 
Source: Dao Heng Securities Research Report 
\ 
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CHAPTER n . 
METHODOLOGY 
In this study, we try to compare the performance of red chips as a whole over 
time by constructing a red-chip index, and also make a comparison in relation to the 
performance of blue chips which are represented by the Hang Seng Index. We will 
use the same formula for the Red-chip Index (RCI) as is used for calculating the Hang 
Seng Index which is a value weighted index comprised of 33 constituent stocks. The 
formula for calculating the Hang Seng Index is: 
33 33 
HSI = I： (PiNiX / 5： (PiNi)i964.7.31 ⑴ 
i=l i=l 
p. ： Price per share of constituent stock 
Ni : number of issued constituent share 
The base year is 31st July 1964 and the HSI was fixed to be 100. [For 
further discussion of the HSI, see Manual of Securities Industry in Scott Eds 
(1992, P.63-66)] 
And the formula for calculating the red-chips index is as follows: 
38 38 
R C I = E i m d i / 2： (PiNi)i992.12.31 (1) 
i=l i=l 
The base year for Redchips is 31 December 1992 and the index is fixed at 100. [For 
\ • 
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further discussion of RCI, see the Dao Heng Securities Research Reports] 
The return on the red-chips index is: 
R R C I = RCIi - RCIo / RCIo 
Similarly, the return on the HSI is 
R H S I = HSIi - HSIo / HSIo 
The return of both indices will be calculated weekly. 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) developed by Sharpe, Lintner, and Mossin，is 
used to measure the sensitivity of the changes in stock return and determine the 
systematic risk (B). 
Mathematically, the modeP is written as 
E(Ri) = Rf + Bi [ E(RJ - Rf] 
where E(Ri) = expected return of a security i 
Rf = risk free return of the market 
E(RJ = expected return of the market 
Bi = systematic risk = Cov (R!，RJ/o^ (RJ 
2 The model is developed based on the following assumptions: 
i) investors are risk-averse expected utility maximizers 
ii) investors choose portfolios on the basis of their expected mean and variance of return. Return is measured by the mean returns 
expected from a portfolio of assets while risk is measured by the variance of these portfolios returns 
iii) investors have homogeneous expectations regarding the means, variances and covariances of security returns 
iv) investors have identical time horizons 
V) information is freely available to investors 
vi) there is a risk-free asset and investors can borrow as well as lend at the risk free rate 
vii) no tax, no transaction costs or other market imperfections 
viii) total asset quantity is fixed and all assets are marketable and divisible 
\ 
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Although some of the assumptions are unrealistic, many empirical tests have 
been done to test the validity of the model and found that CAPM is a quite reasonable 
pricing model. 
In this study, we will work out the systematic risk beta (B) of the all the red-
chips by applying the CAPM and based upon 
Bi = (Tim I 心 
where a-^  denotes the covariance of the returns on red-chip i and the market portfolio 
or market index, and 心 denotes the variances of the returns on the constituents Hang 
Seng stocks. 
2.1 Period of study 
The period of study is from Jan 1993 to Dec 1993，which is the period that 
began with the shell company take-overs by mainland Chinese State enterprises which 
sparked enormous speculative buying interest of redchips, and the six state-owned 
enterprises - "H" shares listed in Hong Kong further attracted interests in the 
Redchips. Nevertheless, the introduction of China's July austerity measures reversed 
the upward momentum from July to September, and further dampened investors 
sentiment about the Red Chips at the fears of a credit crunch and the sharp 
devaluation of the yuan. The redchip stocks began to pick up in November when 
China's declaration of an end to the five-month-old austerity program in the Third 
\ 
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Plenum of the Communist Party implied an apparent success in cooling its overhead 
economy. 
In our study, the daily stock price of the 35 'Red-Chips' (refer to Appendix 
Two for the list of Red-Chips) has been recorded. The weekly returns of the 
individual Red-chips are calculated by comparing the consecutive Friday's closing 
stock prices. 
The source of the data comes from 
(1) Hong Kong Stock Exchange - daily closing stock prices 
(2) Dao Heng Securities Ltd - the Red-chip Index (RCI) 
(3) Hang Seng Index Services Ltd - daily closing Hang Seng Index 
(4) Yamaichi Int'l Ltd - 'China Concept' constituent stocks 
2,2 Redchip Index (RCI) 
RCI measures changes in the market value of a portfolio of 35 stocks due to 
changes in the prices of the individual stocks. Similar to the manipulation of the 
Hang Seng Index as in the equation (1) earlier that each redchip stock is weighted by 
the total number of shares outstanding, reflecting the relative weight of each company 
in the index through its total market value being used in the calculation and not just 
the price of one share. 
In effect, the Redchip Index is computed by multiplying the share price for 
\ 
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each company in the index by the number of outstanding shares of each respective 
issue. The sum of these total market values for the shares conveyed is then expressed 
as a percentage of the aggregate value. The base period is set on 31 December 1992 
with the index at 100. 
2.3 Share price return 
The performance of each individual red chip stock that were listed in Hong 
Kong will be compared with the performance of Hang Seng Index which is a market 
index. Firstly, the stock price return of an individual company is calculated by the 
following formula: 
Rit = (Pit - Pit-i) / PiM ——（2) 
where: 
Rit is the return of the stock of company i at period t 
Pit is the closing stock price of company i at period t 
In our study, our selected period t is weekly. We captured each Friday's 
closing price of each Red-chip and calculated the stock price return by comparing the 
closing price with preceding Friday. 
Then，we calculate the excess return by eliminating the market risk by using 
the following equation: 
, \ 
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ERit = (Rit - Rhsi,t) … … ⑶ 
2.4 Initial Public Offering (IPO) 
A major distinction between the valuation of seasoned and unseasoned stocks 
is that the CAPM assumption of an effective market where the information of returns 
and risks of a public company can easily be accessed by all market participants, can 
only be applied to listed shares but not unseasoned new shares. 
In our study, we also want to find out whether there is any significant 
difference in buying interest of new Redchips issues and any evidence of positive 
initial performance which causes abnormal return of the new issues. Thereby, we 
measure the stock price return (and adjusted with HSI) of the first trading day, first 
partial month performance, and second to fifth month performance of the 9 red-chips 
issued in 1993. 
However, as there were only 9 red-chips issued in 1993 and dispersed only 
on six calendar month of the year. Therefore, it is difficult for us to study the 
seasoning effect by following the RATS model [refer to price performance of 
common stock new issues by Ibbotson (1975)]. 
\ 
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2.5 Estimating betas 
From the available data for the period from Oct 1992 to Dec 1993，we try to 
work out the B of the red chips (35 listed companies) individually and then as a 
portfolio. 
The term Bi is defined as : 
Bi = cXiM / o^M - ( 4 ) 
Bi is known as the beta coefficient for security i. 
where denotes the covariance of the returns on stock i and the market portfolio 
or market index 
denotes the variance of returns on the market portfolio or market index. 
A stock that has a return that mirrors the return on the market index, ie HSI 
in our study, will have a beta equal to one. Stocks with betas greater than one are 
more volatile than the market index and are known as aggressive stocks. In contrasts, 
stocks with beta less than one are less volatile than the market index and are known 
as defensive stocks. Beta measures the sensitivity of the security's returns to the 
market index's returns. Thus if two securities have different betas, it means that they 
have different sensitivities to the returns of the market portfolios or index. As each 
individual red-chip beta is worked out, we can predict the beta of the red-chip 
portfolio. Since the beta of a portfolio is simply a weighted average of the betas of 
\ 
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its component securities, where the proportions invested in the securities are the 
respective weights. That is the beta of a portfolio can be calculated as: 
N 
B = E XA ——(5) 
i=l 
By analysing the red-chips according to the above methods, we hope that we 
would be able to find out certain characteristics of red-chips besides ownership. 
2.6 P/E comparison 
The P/E ratio is simply the price per share divided by the earnings per share. 
Estimating an appropriate P/E ratio has long been a favourite approach among 
security analysts for deciding whether stocks are under- or overpriced. In our study, 
we only took a snapshot of the P/E ratio of the Red-Chips on 31 December 1993 and 
to note whether there is any significant discrepancies between the P/E ofredchips and 
the other stocks in the same industries. A significant disparity of the P/E ratio shows 
the investors' different expectation on the potential earnings of the Red-chips. 
\ 
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CHAPTER m . 
RESULTS 
3.1 Background information on the performance of Red-chips in 1993 
The number of constituent stocks in the Red-chips Index (RCI) has increased 
markedly from 14 in 1992 to 38 in 1993. The 1993 increase included a rash of shell 
take-overs by Chinese-backed companies in the first half of the year, and the listing 
of the six state-owned "H" shares in the second-half. 
As a whole, the performance of Red Chips lagged that of blue chips during 
1993 [refer to Figure 1]. The Red-chip Index, rose 81.7 percent to close the year at 
181.69，compared with a 115.7 percent surge in the Hang Seng Index which closed 
at 11,888.39 points. 
However, in the first half of the year, the Red-chip Index outperformed the 
market, soaring 40 percent to hit a peak of 140.88 on June 28. This compared well 
with a 30-percent rise in the Hang Seng Index. The outstanding performance of Red-
chip Index stemmed in large part from shell company take-overs by mainland Chinese 
State enterprises which sparked enormous speculative buying interest 
But China's July austerity measures, introduced to cool its overheated 
economy, reversed the upward momentum of the Red Chips from July to September. 
\ 
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Fears of a credit crunch and the sharp devaluation of the Yuan dampened investors 
sentiment about the Red Chips. And from mid-August, the Red-chip Index lagged 
the Hang Seng Index. The gap widened in October's bullish run when massive 
overseas funds flew into the Hongkong stock market to buy mainly blue chips. This 
followed the well publicised re-rating of Hongkong stocks by US-based Morgan 
Stanley. 
The Red-chip stocks began to pick up in November, China's declaration of 
an end to the five-month-old austerity programme in the Third Plenum of the 
Communist Party implied an apparent success in cooling its overheated economy. In 
addition, many solid Red-chip companies, such as Guangdong Investment, Guangzhou 
Investment and China Overseas, undertook overseas roadshows which attracted much 
buying interest in these companies. Furthermore, "H" shares also performed well in 
response to the Initial Public Offers of Maanshan Iron and Kumming Machine Tool. 
Interest in Red Chips declined in December on fears of a devaluation of the 
Yuan following the unification of China's two-tier exchange rate system, and 
implementation of tax reforms. In particular, those "H" shares currently enjoying 
subsidies from the Chinese Government were hit the hardest. The result of our studies 
shows a similarity with the results published by Dao Heng Research and is illustrated 
in Figure 1. 
\ 
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3.2 Empirical analysis 
In our study, we tried to find out whether there is any similarity in the 
performance between RCI and HSI. Firstly, we calculated the weekly returns of the 
HSI and RCI by comparing the closing indices on each Friday using the equation : 
Rit = (Pit - Pit-i) / Pit-i 
then calculated out the correlation coefficient and covariance of the returns of HSI 
and RCI individually. 
The Correlation Coefficient of Alpha H S I , R C I I S 
Ot HSI,RCI = Cov (HSI, RCI) / (Thsi，(^ rci 
and we found that the correlation coefficient is a positive value of 0.7，it shows that 
as HSI increases, the RCI likewise increases. 
19 
The covariance between RCI and HSI is shown belows in Table Two. 
Table Two 
Covariances of HSI and RCI 
Covariances HSI RCI 
HSI 0.0012352 0.0009909 
RCI 0.0009909 0.00161 
The low value of the covariance between RCI and HSI indicated that there is 
little or no relationship between the returns of the HSI and RCI. It is surprising that 
there is no direct relation between the performance of HSI and RCI, however, CITIC 
is the only one constituent stock in both HSI and RCL Once the covariance is 
calculated, the beta of Redchip Index's can be calculated using the equation: 
BRCI，HSI = Cov RCI,HSI 丨 ^HSI 
=0.8021888 < 1 = market risk 
B R C I，H S I is less than 1.0 which is a benchmark value of HSI. Thus, we concluded that 
the relative systematic risk of RCI is less than the market risk which is measured by 
the HSI. (Assume market, the HSI, has by definition, B equals to one). 
\ 
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3.3 Share price returns 
The price performance of the 35 Redchips constituent stocks in 1993 ranged 
from 4-1,275% to -28.54%, the percentage was calculated by comparing the closing 
stock price on 31 December 1992 and 1993. Among the RCI constituent stocks, 15 
out of 33 outperformed the HSI, but the price of three constituent stocks had been 
decreased regardless of the upward market momentum of Hang Seng Index. 
When we calculated the weekly return of each of the 35 Redchip constituent 
stocks in 1993 using the equation (2) defined earlier, we found out that most of the 
red chips companies had positive weekly return in 1993，with only the exception of 
Paladin Ltd which had negative weekly return in most of the weeks in 1993. 
\ 
The excess weekly return of the redchips ranged from -0.105% to 4-23.65% 
per week in 1993. Seabase Int'l is the most outstanding company with average 
weekly excess return (the sum of the weekly returns and divided by the number of 
trading weeks in 1993) of +0.48% per week in 1993. While Paladin has an average 
weekly excess return of -0.12% per week in 1993. 
\ 
21 
3.4 Performance of new issues in 1993 
3.4.1 General Trends 
New listings on the Hong Kong stock market have steadily increased over 
recent years and they have been characterised by massive oversubscription and shown 
extremely robust price performance on their market debuts. 
A total of 64 companies were listed on the stock exchange in 1993, compared 
with 44 listed in 1992 and 48 in 1991. 9 out of the 64 companies were redchip ‘ 
constituent companies. The details of them are shown in Table Three: 
Table Three 
The price performance of new issues in 1993 (1st day close & year end close vs offer) 
Companies Date of Issue close on Close on % Subscription 
issue price debut 31/12/93 change rate 
1. Beiren Printing 06/08/93 2.80 3.60 9.75 +248.2 25.00 
(+28.6%) 
2. Denway 22/02/93 1.22 2.20 2.425 +98.8 658.0 
Investment ( + 80.3%) 




Companies Date of Issue close on Close on % Subscription 
issue price debut 31/12/93 change rate 
4. Kumming 07/12/93 1.98 5.80 5.95 +200.5 628.00 
Machine ( + 192.9%) 
5. Maanshan Iron 03/11/93 2.27 3.65 4.30 +89.4 68.70 
(+60.8%) 
6. Shanghai 26/07/93 1.58 1.61 ( + 1.9%) 3.25 +105.7 1.73 
Petrochemical 
7. Stone Electronic 16/08/93 1.26 2.65 4.00 +217.5 42.00 
(+110.3%) 
8. Tsingtao 15/07/93 2.80 3.60 9.75 +248.2 109.47 
Brewery (+28.6%) 




When comparing the performance of newly listed redchips with other 
companies listed in 1993. We have the findings documented in Table Four. 
Table Four 
The price performance comparison of new issued red-chips 
and all new issued stocks in 1993 
% change of issue price and debut % change from issued date to 
31/12/93 
Maximum Minimum Average Maximum Minimum Average 
All newly 192.9% -11% 34.7% 302.9% -31% 83.88% 
listed in 
1993 
Redchips 192.9% 1.9% 62.9% 302.9% 89.4% 186.4% 
listed in 
1993 
Source : Dao Heng Securities Research Report 
The debut performance of redchips was remarkable. Gains were recorded by 
all 9 redchip companies on their first day of trading with an average price surge of 
62.9%. Kumming ranked first with a remarkable gain of 193.9% on its issue price. 
\ 
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Comparing issue price with 1993 year-end closing price of all the issued 
stocks, the best performer was also a Red-chip company, Wing Shan, which gained 
302.9%. Six of the nine companies outperformed the Hang Seng Index which 
recorded 115.67% gain over the whole 1993 while the other three stocks slightly 
lagged behind the movement of the Hang Seng Index. 
When we looked into more detailed at the stock price of the first 40 trading 
days of these 9 new redchips, we found that the performance of the six H shares had 
significantly remarkable performance. This is because of the investors are optimistic 
about the，open policy' and the future economy of PRC, H shares and thus attract the 
their interest. While the other non H shares redchips did not have the same good 
performance. 
3.4.2 Seasoning Effect 
The results (see Table Five) indicate that eight of the nine new issued stocks 
have prominent positive performance (already adjusted HSI) at the end of first month 
from the offering date. Whereas the price performance at the end of second to fifth 
month have not indicated a consistent positive performance. 
The only exception is the Shanghai Petrochemical which is the second H-share 
immediately after Tsingtao listed in HK, the price was only 1.9% increase at the end 
of first trading day and the price even felled at the end of first month. The poor 
performance is because of insufficient information disclosed to the investors, the low 
\ 
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subscription rate revealed investors did not pursuit on this stock as they did not 
understand well the company. 
This positive initial performance of red-chips shows that the either the offering 
price is set too low or that investors systematically overvalue new issues at the end 
of the first month of seasoning. The results are consistent with the previous price 




Adjusted (reduced HSI) price performance (%) of new issues 
at the end of the first trading day, and 1st to 5th months 
of trading 
Red Chips 1st day Partial 1st Second Third Fourth Fifth 
debut(%) Mth(%) Mth(%) Mth(%) Mth(%) Mth(%) 
Wingshan 47.1 44.92157 3.327048 -11.3199 -6.166 2.25308 
6 
Stone Electronic 110.3 65.2112 -1.67542 -8.88866 44.0221 -15.1728 
6 
Shanghai 1.90 -9.50494 41.2802 -4.67542 9.91095 3.16581 
Petrochemical 6 4 
Maanshan 60.8 72.03352 -18.5924 
Guangzhou 15.4 60.19169 -3.15691 -2.73535 -2.73535 6.75630 
Shipyard 9 
Denway 80.3 80.44705 -16.0861 -4.78515 -18.9626 -8.12575 
Beiren 28.6 84.23015 -1.03026 7.954837 2.18542 3.38263 
2 9 
Tsingtao 28.6 26.63571 30.43566 59.22348 4.68821 -19.8229 
2 
Kumming 192.9 178.4 
Avg price perf 62.88 66.95 3.83 3.86 3.66 -3.06 
\ 
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3.5 Beta estimation 
Beta assesses the risk of stocks compared with the market index which is 
measured by Hang Seng Index. The beta is calculated by using equation (4) defined 
earlier. The betas of the Red-chips were found to be in the range of -0.91 (First 
Shanghai) to +1.4. (Wing Shan) (See Appendix Five) Four companies had the betas 
which were greater than or equal to one, it means that these companies had higher 
systematic risk than the Hang Seng Index but with higher return than HSI. Wing 
Shan has the highest beta of 1.4 which showed that the systematic risk of this 
companies is 1.4 times the Hang Seng Index. 
Four Red-chips had negative betas which indicates that they more in the 
opposite direction to the HSI. The remaining 25 companies had betas between 0 and 
1，which have the same trend in movement as the HSI. All of the H shares 
companies have comparatively lower betas, with a range of -0.44 to 0.87. This 
means that the H shares are of lower risk than the Hang Seng Index constituent 
stocks. By using equation (5) the beta of redchips is calculated as 0.69. 
Furthermore, we found that CITIC Pacific, the heaviest weighted of the RCI 
constituent stocks, has a beta 0.923 which is closest to 1, which showed that the 
systematic risk of CITIC is closet to the Hang Seng Index. In fact, CITIC Pacific is 
a constituent stock of HSI. 
\ 
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In addition, the betas of redchips after reduced the market risk of HSI (refer to 3rd 
column of Appendix Five) showed that most of the betas are negative values and 
consistent with the beta before reduced the market risk. 
3.6 P/E comparison 
Based on historical earnings, the P/E of redchips on 31/12/93 are in the range 
of 12.13 to 90.47. Most of the redchips, in particular the shell companies, have 
higher P/E ratio comparing with the companies in the same industries. The reason 
may be that investors expect a good growth potential for those companies having 
major investments in China. Furthermore, some redchips have attracted excessive 
speculative trading and resulted massive price appreciation which lead to abnormal 
high P/E ratio eg. Hoi Sing has P/E of 90.47. 
3.7 China factors 
There is no doubt that the performance of Redchips are definitely sensitive to 
the China factors, such as the unresolved renewal of MFN for China, inflation 
problem, devaluation of the yuan, tax reforms etc. The risks factors include: (a) the 
political considerations of the economic reform polices as many of the economic 
measures which have been or are being implemented by the PRC government are 
unprecedented or experimental they may be subject to adjustment or refinement which 
may have adverse effects on the companies; (b) economic considerations such as high 
29 
inflation, depreciation of yuan; (c) exchange control and exchange rate fluctuations; 
(d) laws and regulations such as MFN/GATT; (e) "back-door" listing is a risk to 




THE VIEW OF PRACTITIONERS 
Dao Heng Securities is the only firm which has developed the concept of the 
Red Chip Index (RCI) which shows the movement of red chips relative to the 
movements of the Hang Seng Index. We had an opportunity to interview Dr. Mark 
Gallagher, the Research Manager of Dao Heng Securities and the analyst Mr. Benny 
Chung to get their views points on the Red chips. 
They categorized the performance of redchips into two groups: 
(a) those companies that have the focal point for investment on the mainland China 
(b) those companies that have diversified their investment in China, Hong Kong or 
overseas. 
They believe that the performance of group (b) is quite similar to other 
companies listed in HK，as those companies are almost running in the same economic 
environment, where their behaviour has similar stock return, P/E with other 
companies in the same industries. 
On the other hand, the performance of group (a) is quite different from other 
companies listed in HK, as investors anticipated that these companies are better 
placed to capture the rapid economic growth of the PRC. While the share prices of 




The result of our study is not surprised that there is a positive correlation 
between HSI and RCI with a magnitude of less than one (equals to 0.7), it shows that 
HSI and RCI have the same direction of momentum. However, most of the redchips 
especially the H shares performed well resulting in a positive performance in response 
to the initial trading period in the Initial Public Offers. This substantial positive 
initial performance of Red-chips shows that the offering price is set too low or that 
investors systematically overvalue new issues at the end of the first month of 
seasoning. Nevertheless, we believe that this advantage will be reduced whenever 
more H shares are listed in the Hong Kong stock market, as the offering price will 
be set to more reasonable (China government is quite concerned the assets of the 
state-owned enterprises is undervalued at the time when the shares of state-owned 
enterprises were sold out) and also the attractiveness of the red-chips to the investors 
will also reduce. 
In our study, we found that generally redchips have lower betas than HSI, 
which shows that the redchips have lower systematic risk or lower correlation with 
HSI, but also lower returns than HSI. Investors should consider the betas of 
Redchips to define their own portfolios. 
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We found that there are two distinct types of performance behaviour in 
Redchip stocks: (i) those that are heavily invested in PRC，eg Stone Electronic and 
(ii) those that are diversified in Hong Kong, PRC and elsewhere, eg CITIC Pacific. 
The group (i) investors believed that the economy growth in PRC is faster than Hong 
Kong, they postulate better potential growth of those companies which are heavily 
invested in PRC, therefore, it is more speculative with a higher P/E than the 
companies in the same industries in Hong Kong. Whilst the investors believed that 
the performance of the companies in group (ii) is close to other conglomerates in HK. 
We anticipated that the significant growing of Red Chips in the Hong Kong 
stock market is manifested in their market capitalization. In the coming year, impact 
of these Red Chips on the overall market could be significant. Notable changes with 
respect to equity composition will also take place, shifting the market's structure to 
a more balanced and diversified composition. 
� 
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PRICE pcocnPMANCE OF THE 50 CHINA-CONCEPT STOCKS 
PFU。fci Ktnrv^ Closing on I Closing on C ^ g e 
Pnmrvmv Code 
^ E M elsT OT^ 12.0 1 
7 9 4.675 5.200 11-2 2 
Giordano 二 1.940 7.2 3 
二 s C h 丨 na 2 ^875 3.050 6.1 4 
East Miotic 4.650 4.875 4.8 5 
WoKeeHong = 2.150 3.6 6 
Hanny Magnetics 二 仏 。 3.275 。.8 7 
GoldPeaic. 二 1.990 0.5 8 
Shell Electnc , .350 4.625 (0.5) 9 
Fa請ood 16.800 _ I L 
• J oh _ Electnc g f ^ C T T l ^ ^ ” 
丁e餅in⑵ 728 3.225 3.175 0.6) 12 
Lam Soon Food ^^ ^ ^ 880 1.850 0-6) 13 
S.Meg^a 1.860 1.830 (1.6) 14 
Luks industna 二 30.750 (3.1) 15 
Bank of East As.a 二 ' o e ^ o . 0.600 (3.2). 16 
A_Gro 叩 二 。..73。 0.750 (3.8) 17 
AsiaCommercal ； 2.500 2.400 (4.0) 18 
Yip's Hang Cheung 二: 1 咖 1.570 (5.4) 19 
Kong Wah ； 2200 2.075 ( 5 . 7 ) _ ^ 
Golden Resources " " " " T o W " l i � ^ ^ 21 
Dain^Famj ； 1.530 (6.7) 22 
Asia Standard 4400 4.100 (6.8) 23 
Chen Hsong 7 3 0 0 6.800 (6.8) 24 
Jardine IntM Motor = 2475 2.300 (7.1) 25 
丁叩 Form 37.000 34.250 (7.4) 26 
China Ught 9 200 8.500 (7.6) 27 
012 18.300 16.900 (7.7) 28 
Henderson Land ^ 2 275 2.100 (7.7) 29 
Pacific Concord . 3400 12.200 (9.0) 30 
W'nsorlnd'l • : _ 二 l u d ~ T ： ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Hung Hing Print = .400 17.500 (9.8) 32 
New world ；^； 5：050 4.550 (9.9) 33 
Hopewell 口 叨 1.600 (10.1) 34 
Jinhiii 口 40. 1.560 (10.3) 35 
丫ue 丫U 印 Q 4 000 3.575 (10.6) 36 
Champion Q 940 0.840 (10.6) 37 
Hartour Ring 9200 8.200 • (10.9) 38 
Kumagai _ 2200 1.960 (10.9) 39 
innovative ig'.SOO _ I L 
Hsa IsoT ( ” . ” 41 
C.P pokph^nd 0)3 3. 29 .- (11.8) 42 
SHK Properties 【 』 1 咖 ^ ^ ^ 。 (12.2) 43 
Wong's infl ^'oso 0.930 (13.9) 44 
Herald 8.150 7.000 (14.1) 45 
083 5.400- 4.525 (14.4) 46 
SinoLand ^ 040 0.890 (14.4) 47 
CN 丁 Group ； 2 . 4 7 5 (15.4) 48 
Tian An China ^650 1.390 (15.8) 49 
Great Wall ^ ；830 1.520 (16.9) _ 5 0 _ 
Tomej - J _ u 抖 •！丨 . ( 8 . 5 ) 
J ； r ^ i ^ 义 卯 ~5 .854 .61 I (7.8) 
Hang Seng I n d e x _ _ _ ^ — ^ J ^ T I T (7.0) 
AH Ordinaries index 二肌。。』——： — 
\ 
. Dao Hens Research : � . 
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APPENDIX TWO 
THE DETAIL CLASSIFICATION OF RED CHIPS IS AS FOLLOWS: 
Category 1. Category 2. Category 3. 
Companies with solid earnings H shares Shell companies 
China Overseas Land Beiren Printing Machinery China Aerospace 
China Resources Ent. Guangzhou Shipyard Continental Mariner 
China Travel Shanghai Petrochemical Investment 
CITIC Pacific Tsingtao Brewery Eastern Century Holdings 
Denway Inv Maanshan Iron HK Worsted Mill 
Kumming Machine Tool Int，l Industries 
Guangdong Inv. Shougang Concord Grand 
Guangzhou Inv 
Hai Hong Onfem Holdings Ltd 
Ka Wah Bank Poly Investment Holdings 
Stone Electronic Technology Min Xin 
China Ever Bright 
Union Bank Shanghai Int'l 





Shougang Concord Int't 
12 companies 6 companies 18 companies 
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APPENDIX THREE 
RISK OF INVEST B SHARES 
i) different accounting and legal system - economic activities need the support 
of a sound legal system, and the intervention of government should be reduced to a 
minimum. Nothing would create more fear and uncertainty in the market than 
occurrences that were unpredictable within the legal system. National framework of 
laws and regulation for stock markets in China are in their infancy and have not been 
tested. Government intervention is still considerable. 
Furthermore, the accounting policy in PRC is not yet recognised 
internationally, it is difficult for investors or analysts to get full confidence in the 
published financial statement of the companies. 
ii) political risk - the PRC government first embarked on its economic reform 
polices in 1978. In his working report to the eighth National People's Congress held 
in March 1993, Li Peng, the Premier of the State Council, affirmed the government's 
commitment to the implementation of its "open-door" policy and further economic 
reforms. Nevertheless, any significant change in social, political or economic 
conditions may affect such economic reforms. Further, as many of the economic 
reform measures which have been or are being implemented by the PRC government 
are unprecedented or experimental, they may be subject to adjustment or refinement 
\ 
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which may have adverse effects on the investments in China. 
iii) improper release of financial information. Currently, it is very difficult to 
get information on China's stock market. The listed companies have no obligation 
to disclose any significant information to the public. They are compelled only to hold 
a shareholders' meeting once a year and to disclose the profit and loss statement. 
iv) liquidity of the market - China's stock market is still in its infancy with only 
42 stocks listed, including fifteen B shares, on the two stock exchanges in Shanghai 
and Shenzhen at the end of June 1992. 
v) high transaction costs - the following transaction costs are levied on the 
.J. 
purchase or sale of B shares: (a) account opening fee - US$20 for individual 
investors; US$200 for institutional investor; (b) brokerage - it varies from 0.4% 
(transactions exceeds RMB 5 million) to 0.6% (transaction with minimum of US$20) 
for authorised domestic securities house; (c) transfer fee-0.1% of the par value per 
B share; (d) settlement fee -0.05% of the total transaction value (maximum RMB 300 
per transaction); (e) stamp duty - 0.3% of the total transaction value; (f) deposit 




THE RECENT DEVELOPMENT OF THE MARKET 
1984 Public issue of shares in shanghai - Public issue 
of shares in Fielo Acoustics Company, the first 
issue of this kind in China since 1949. 
1986 The creation of secondary market (OTC market) in 
Shanghai - The industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China Shanghai branch set up the first share 
trading counter ^  
1988 Shenzhen companies started to issue shares to the 
public - Shenzhen Development Bank was listed on 
the Shenzhen OTC market through an offer of shares 
to the public. 
1990 First Centralised Stock Exchange in China -
trading started in China's first centralised stock 
exchange in Shenzhen (1 December)• 
Official opening of Shanghai Securities Exchange 
(19 December) 
1991 Official opening of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (3 
July). 
The opening of stock market to foreign investors 一 
International offer of B shares of Shanghai Vacuum 
Electron Device and Shenzhen Southern Glass. 
1992 Listing of B shares - B shares of Shanghai Vacuum 
Electron Device listed on the Shanghai Securities 
Exchange (21 February)• 
B shares of Shenzhen Southern Glass listed on the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (28 February) • 
\ 
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APPENDIX FIVE BETAS OF REDCHIPS 
Chips Beta Beta (reduced market risks) 
Shougang Grand 0.8555 -0.0086 
Shougang Int^l 0«28985 -0.012 
China Overseas Ltd 0.90587 -0.0501 
Wing Shan 1.40349 0.02683 
Santai Mfg 0.47145 -0.0507 
seabase 1.0588 -0.1159 
Paladin 0.34003 -0.2798 
Stone Electronic 0.70683 -0.1033 
union Bank 0.78688 -0.0066 
Shanghai Pechem -0.4422 -0.1998 
MaGang 0.85511 -0.2341 
Guangzhou Shipyard 0,81388 -0.0688 
China Travel HK 0.71581 -0.0187 
China Resources Ent. 0-76041 "Q'245 
Guangdong Inv 1-24453 -0.1696 
CITIC Pacific 0.92302 0.12739 
Poly Investment ： 0.34409 -0.1228 
China Everbright 0.469805 -••0427 
ONFEM Holdings 0.46981 -0.1297 
First Shanghai -0.9068 -0.0261 
Min Xin 0.10141 -0.181 
Shnaghai Int'l -0.0727 -。遍 
Denway Inv. 0.55331 -••1672 
Beiren Printing 0.49583 -0.0596 
Ka Wah Bank 0.58462 -0.1984 
Tsinqtao Brewery 0.73623 -0.0405 
Beijing Dev. 0.00554 -0.0603 
Hai Hong 1� 0 9 7 5 - 0� 6 7 5 
Paragon 0.20922 0.00505 
Guangzhou Inv. 0.6092 -0.0087 
Eastern Century 0.5895 -0.0953 
China Aerospace -0.4831 0.02266 






























































































































































































































































































































































Lau, Samuel. H share make a hit in Hong Kong. The Securities Journal November 
1993 P.49-52 
Ibbotson, R.G. (1975) 
"Hong Kong Shares Red Chips today, blue tomorrow" The Economist June 1993 
Scott, R.H., Eds (1992). Manual of the Securities Industry, published by the Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd. 
"New Mainland Share Issues Face Challenges" The Asian Wall Street Journal. June 
28-July 4，1993. 
"China's B shares capture the investor's enthusiasm". Asia Money and Finance 
July/Aug 1992 No. 8 P.61-64 
Economic Digest. February 22, 1993 P. 10 
Economic Digest. February 22, 1993 P. 11 
Economic Digest, February 22, 1993 P. 12-13 
Economic Digest, February 22，1993 P. 12-13 
Interview 
Dr. Mark Gallagher. Research Manager - Dao Heng Securities. Interview, 25 
February 1994. 




 一 ： . ： ： ： ： ： , ： .
 .








‘ “ ： 
























































 二 」 
, . ..、....
 ，.










































 J 〉 v € ， 丄 


























































 ： . ； - . , ,
 ‘,
 一 號 
办 .
 . . •
 •







 w i J H M 





 S T U V











 1 . 1
 fcr
 4
 i J H . ^ 





 M . n /
 ^ N s
 ^ L ^ 
fc









 T , ——.
 :
 >




































 . . " V 








 ： — — . —
 L ^ . . i
 F f
 L r t ^ r s r F S
 r t f e ^ 
\ 
. • ‘ , ‘ 
圓 ； I . • CUHK Librari es mmi MMi 0003«^b736—」 ‘ ‘‘ . • - • 
